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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HABEAS
CORPUS-REACHING THE MERITS OF SUCCESSIVE AND/OR ABUSIVE
PETITIONS-The United States Supreme Court held that
showing that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent will allow a court to
reach the merits of a habeas corpus petition otherwise barred as
successive and/or abusive.
Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
Lloyd E. Schlup Jr. ("Schlup") was one of three inmates at
Missouri State Penitentiary charged with the stabbing death of
another inmate, Arthur Dade ("Dade").' Schlup was tried in
December of 1985 and sentenced to death for his role in the
murder.2 Two corrections officers witnessed the murder and
identified Schlup as a participant.' There was no physical
evidence linking Schlup to the murder and the corrections
officers were the only witnesses who testified as to Schlup's role
in the murder.4
Schlup pled innocent, claiming that he was not present at the
murder.' Schlup's claim was based on a videotape that showed
1. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 854 (1995). Robert O'Neil ("O'Neil") stabbed
Dade and received a death sentence. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 856 n.2. Rodnie Stewart
("Stewart") was sentenced to 50 years in prison for his role as an accomplice. Id.
2. Id. at 854.
3. Id. at 854-55. Sergeant Roger Flowers ("Flowers") testified that Schlup
jumped on Dade's back after Stewart threw a container of steaming liquid into
Dade's face. Id. at 855. Flowers also testified that he grabbed Stewart as O'Neil and
Schlup fled. Id. Officer John Maylee testified that O'Neil stabbed Dade several times
in the chest, fled, and threw the weapon out a window. Id.
4. Id. at 855.
5. Id. at 855 n.3.
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him in the prison dining room sixty-five seconds prior to a
distress call that was placed by Captain James Eberle.6 Schlup's
innocence depended on the amount of time between the murder
and the receipt of a distress call by the dinning room guards.7 A
transcript of an inmate interview contained evidence that the
distress call came shortly after the murder and therefore, Schlup
could not have made it to the dining room before the distress
call was received.8 Schlup also provided affidavits of inmates
who witnessed the incident and stated that Schlup was not
present.9
Schlup's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the
Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. ° Schlup filed a pro se petition for a federal
writ of habeas corpus, asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel." The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri denied relief based on procedural grounds 2
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed based on an examination of the record. 3 The court of
appeals denied rehearing and the United States Supreme
6. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 855-56.
7. Id. at 855. If the distress call was sent shortly after the murder, Schlup
would not have had time to get from the prison floor to the dining room. Id. Had
there been a delay between the murder and the distress call, Schlup may have had
enough time to make it to the dining room if he walked at a normal pace. Id. A
prison investigator testified that it took 33 seconds to run from the scene of the
stabbing to the dining room and one minute and 37 seconds to walk the distance at
a normal pace. Id. at 856.
8. Id. at 857-58. John Green ("Green"), an inmate working as a prison clerk,
stated that Flowers told him to call for help. Id. at 857. Green notified the guard
dispatch base shortly after the disturbance began. Id. Schlup argued that if Green
sent out the call for help shortly after the incident, then Schlup could not have been
involved in the murder because the video showed Schlup in the dining room prior to
the call being received. Id. at 857-58.
9. Id. at 858. Inmates Lamont Griffin Bey and Donnell White stated that
they saw the incident and that Schlup was not present. Id. at 858 n.18. Green stat-
ed in an affidavit that the third inmate involved in the murder was not Schlup but
Randy Jordan. Id. at 858. The affidavit of Robert Faherty ("Faherty"), a former
prison lieutenant, stated that Schlup was in his presence for about two and one-half
minutes and then walked to the dining room. Id. at 859. Furthermore, Faherty stat-
ed that Schlup was not nervous, perspiring, or breathing hard. Id.
10. State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920
(1987).
11. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 856. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
Schlup obtained counsel to represent him and file a second petition for habeas relief.
Id. at 857.
12. Schlup v. Armontrout, No. 89-0020c(3), 1989 WL 513565 at *4-*5 (E.D. Mo.
1989), affd, 941 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 945 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 909 (1992).
13. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 945 F.2d
1062 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 909 (1992).
14. Schlup v. Armontrout, 945 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
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Court denied certiorari.15
Schlup's counsel filed a second federal habeas corpus petition
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri which the court dismissed without a hearing." The
district court concluded that Schlup did not show adequate
cause for failing to raise the new claims in the first petition. 7
The court also held that Schlup could not satisfy the
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard needed in order
for a court to reach the merits of a second writ as required by
Sawyer v. Whitley."5
Schlup appealed the district court's denial of further relief.9
Schlup argued that the district court should have heard his
second petition because he supplemented his claim with a
"colorable showing of factual innocence" as set forth in the
United States Supreme Court plurality decision Kuhlmann v.
Wilson.2" The court of appeals affirmed that the Sawyer
standard was controlling in deciding Schlup's claim of
innocence.' The court of appeals concluded that the evidence of
guilt supplied at trial precluded consideration of the
constitutional claims raised in Schlup's petition."
The court of appeals vacated its original opinion, but
909 (1992).
15. Schlup v. Armontrout, 503 U.S. 909 (1992) (denying certiorari).
16. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 857-58. Schlup's second federal habeas corpus peti-
tion asserted: (1) actual innocence and therefore, his execution would violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) trial counsel failed to interview alibi wit-
nesses, constituting ineffective assistance; and (3) the state failed to disclose critical
evidence illustrating his innocence. Id. at 857. The Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The
Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
17. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 858.
18. Id. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). The Court in Sawyer
held that a fundamental miscarriage of justice results if a person is actually inno-
cent of the crime or is innocent of the sentence received. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2519
(citations omitted).
19. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 858. Schlup filed a motion with the district court to
have the dismissal set aside. Id. Schlup also filed a supplemental motion indicating
that he had an affidavit from Green which identified Jordan as the third accomplice
in Dade's murder. Id. The district court denied both motions without opinion. Id. at
858-59.
20. Id. at 859. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
21. Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-3272, 1993 WL 409815 at *2-*3 (8th Cir.), afrd on
rehearing, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993). The standard in Sawyer requires a petitioner
to show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reason-
able juror would convict. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523 n.13 (citations omitted).
22. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1993), vacated 115 S. Ct.
851 (1995).
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maintained its position that Sawyer controlled Schlup's second
petition. 3 The revised opinion included a discussion of the new
evidence.24 A majority of the court of appeals opined that the
new testimony was not credible and a retrial should not be
permitted. 5 Rehearing en banc was subsequently denied, with
three judges dissenting as to whether the majority should have
applied the Sawyer standard rather than the Kuhlmann
standard.2" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the issue. 7 The Supreme Court vacated the order of the court
of appeals and remanded to the court of appeals with
instructions to remand to the district court for further
proceedings.28
The Supreme Court began consideration of the issues of the
case by distinguishing Schlup's claim of actual innocence from
the innocence claim presented in Herrera v. Collins.29 The
Court noted that the claim made in Herrera was essentially
substantive and Schlup's claim was procedural." The Court
cited Herrera for the proposition that the execution of an
innocent person is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment even though the proceedings leading to the
23. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 740-41. The court of appeals originally decided that the
standard of Sawyer governed Schlup's claim and the evidence adduced at trial pre-
cluded consideration of his constitutional claims. Id. The court of appeals subse-
quently vacated this opinion and substituted an opinion that contained a discussion
of Schiup's new evidence. Id.
24. Id. at 740-43. The court stated that the new affidavit from Green was
inconsistent with his previous testimony. Id. at 742. The court also considered the
affidavit of Faherty and likewise did not consider his testimony to be credible. Id. at
742-43.
25. Id. at 743. Judge Heaney dissented from the court of appeals decision. Id.
at 744 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney opined that the district court should
have conducted an evidentiary hearing, and pending the results, addressed the mer-
its of Schlup's claim. Id. at 747. Judge Heaney further stated that the evidence of
actual innocence was truly persuasive and Schlup's trial counsel's reliance on inter-
view transcripts and failure to conduct individual interviews with witnesses was
proof of ineffectiveness. Id. at 747 n.7.
26. Id. at 754-55. The Kuhlmann standard requires a petitioner to supplement
constitutional claims with a colorable showing of factual innocence to reach the mer-
its of a procedurally barred habeas claim. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454.
27. Schlup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994) (granting certiorari).
28. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion
in which Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 854. Chief
Justice Rehnquist was joined in a dissenting opinion by Justices Kennedy and Thom-
as. Id. at 870. Justice Scalia was joined in a second dissenting opinion by Justice
Thomas. Id. at 874.
29. Id. at 860. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). In Herrera, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, held
that a claim of actual innocence by itself is not grounds for federal habeas relief.
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. See infra, notes 186-210 for a discussion of Herrera.
30. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860.
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conviction and sentence were entirely fair and error free."'
Conversely, Schlup's claim asserted a denial of the constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants."
Because Schlup's claim was procedural and he failed to show
sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse the failure to raise the
same issues in his first petition, the Court stated that a review
of Schlup's claim was proper only if it fell within the class of
cases that implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' The
Court discussed two important characteristics of Schlup's claim
to determine the appropriate standard within that class.34 The
Court first noted that Schlup's claim of innocence was not the
sole consideration for the Court to grant relief.3 The Court
considered a claim of innocence to be the threshold by which
claims that are otherwise constitutionally barred may be
considered on the merits." Drawing what it considered to be a
more important distinction, the Court stated that the trial and
conviction in Herrera had been free of constitutional error, which
justified an extraordinarily high standard of review.37
Conversely, the Court held that Schlup's conviction should not
be held to as high a standard of review because his claim of
innocence was combined with an assertion of constitutional
error.
38
The Court stated that to establish a miscarriage of justice,
new evidence must be provided in addition to claims of
constitutional violations.39 The Court further stated that a
petitioner's ability to argue the merits of the case depends upon
the strength of the new evidence.4" The Court concluded that
31. Id. (citing Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
32. Id. at 860 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, rehearing de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Schlup com-
plained of procedural errors arising from ineffective assistance of counsel and the
withholding of evidence by the prosecution. Id.
33. Id. at 861 (citing McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).
34. Id.
35. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861.
36. Id. The Court stated that the claim for relief was ultimately dependent on
the validity of Schiup's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and withholding of
evidence by the prosecution. Id. at 860.
37. Id. at 861 (citing Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
The Court noted that a conviction resulting from an error free trial, such as that in
Herrera, commands greater deference than one that is a product of constitutional
error. Id. The Court further noted that the appropriate standard of review for a
claim of actual innocence standing alone was not determined in Herrera because the
petitioner failed to make a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence under
any standard. Id. at 861 n.32.
38. Id. at 861.
39. Id.
40. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861. The Court stated:
1996
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the evidence of innocence would have to be strong enough to
make a party's execution "constitutionally intolerable" even if
the conviction was the product of a fair trial, or in a case such as
Schlup's, the evidence need only establish sufficient doubt about
guilt to conclude that the petitioner's execution would be a
miscarriage of justice unless the conviction was the product of a
fair trial.4 '
Applying the above standards to the facts in Schiup, the
Court noted that Schlup's claim for relief on the merits would
fail unless the facts unquestionably established innocence.42
However, the Court stated, Schlup's threshold showing of
innocence would justify reaching a review of the merits of his
constitutional claim if the new facts raised sufficient doubt
about his guilt to question the result of the trial, and the
reviewing court was not certain that the trial was error free. 3
The Court next considered the issue of whether res judicata
applies to habeas corpus petitions." The Court first discussed
the history of habeas relief, prior case law and statutes and
determined that the application of res judicata to habeas corpus
petitions is qualified.4'5 The Court noted that although its prior
decisions did not preclude successive or abusive habeas corpus
petitions entirely, the prior holdings prevented a court from
reaching the merits of successive, abusive and procedurally
[If new] evidence of innocence [is] so strong that a court cannot have confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the
trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be
allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of the underlying
claims.
Id.
41. Id. at 861-62.
42. Id. at 862.
43. Id.
44. Id. Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). Habeas refers to habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum which is a writ to obtain release from unlawful imprisonment. Id. at 709-10.
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is a writ commanding the person detaining another
to produce the body of the prisoner or person detained. Id.
45. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862-63. The Court noted that res judicata did not
apply to habeas relief at common law. Id. at 862. A petitioner could seek relief from
other judges or courts without influence of prior decisions that denied relief. Id. The
Court noted that Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to prevent successive peti-
tions which, were not limited at common law. Id. The referenced statutory section
precludes reaching the merits of a subsequent petition unless the subsequent petition
raises grounds not raised in a prior petition and the judge is satisfied that the writ
has not been abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). See also infra note 110 for the text
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). By limiting successive petitions the Court felt that Congress
was trying to promote comity and finality of judgments. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862.
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defaulted claims absent a showing of cause and prejudice."6
The Court stated that habeas corpus is essentially an
equitable remedy and thus requires a qualified application of res
judicata.47 The Court noted that a court must adjudicate a
successive habeas corpus petition when the "ends of justice"
require, even though there is no explicit statutory exception. 48
The Court stated that an individual's interest in relitigating the
case is weighed against a court's interests in comity and finality
to determine whether the "ends of justice" require adjudication
of the claim.4" The Court concluded that there was an exception
for fundamental miscarriages of justice in the application of res
judicata to habeas corpus writs dependent upon the "ends of
justice" standard.0
Although the Court recognized the existence of an exception in
the application of res judicata to habeas corpus cases, the Court
restricted the exception to extraordinary cases.5 The Court
cited Kuhlmann and Murray v. Carrier2  as linking an
individual's innocence with the fundamental miscarriage of
justice standard to ensure that the exception would only be
applied in extraordinary cases, while extending relief to those
who are deserving.53 Because habeas corpus petitions claiming
actual innocence are rare, the Court concluded that explicitly
tying the miscarriage of justice exception to innocence
accommodates the interests of comity, finality and the
46. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862-63 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451, McClesky
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-93 (1991), Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77 (1977)
and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)).
47. Id. at 863.
48. Id. (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)). The Court also
cited three 1986 cases that were decided on the same day that establish the impor-
tance of an equitable inquiry into habeas cases regardless of the absence of a statu-
tory exception. Id. Kuhlmann was cited as permitting a miscarriage of justice excep-
tion allowing successive claims to be heard despite the removal of the reference to
the "ends of justice" from 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) in 1966. Id. Although successive peti-
tions are generally precluded from review, the Court cited Justice Powell's plurality
opinion in Kuhlman which stated that the interests of the individual in relitigating
claims originally held to be meritless may in some circumstances outweigh the inter-
est in the finality of the prior judgment. Id. (citing Kuhlman, 477 U.S. at 452). Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion in Carrier was also cited as standing for the proposition that
in certain cases, the correction of an unjust incarceration outweighs the principles of
comity and finality. Id. at 864 (citing Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96).
49. Id. at 863 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452 and Carrier, 477 U.S. at
495-96).
50. Id. at 864.
51. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (citing Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496).
52. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
53. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452 and Carrier,
477 U.S. at 496).
1996
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conservation of judicial resources as well as the individual's
interest in justice.5'
Kuhlmann and Carrier were also examined by the Court to
determine the standard of proof that governs consideration of
such claims.5 The Court noted that the standard in each case
was based on the probability of innocence."5 The Court
distinguished the standard in Kuhlmann and Carrier from the
stricter standard in Sawyer, which requires clear and convincing
evidence of innocence. 7
Because the fundamental miscarriage of justice standard
seeks to balance the interests of individuals and society, and the
Carrier standard best balances those interests, the Court
concluded that the standard of Carrier and not Sawyer should
have been applied.58 The Court opined that the Carrier
standard is appropriate when an innocent defendant was
convicted because of constitutional error." Because Sc hi up
claimed actual innocence, the Court concluded that a less
exacting standard than that of Sawyer was appropriate. 0 The
Court held that the Carrier "probably resulted" standard
controls miscarriage of justice claims when a petitioner who has
been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence in
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 864-65 (discussing Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 and Kuhlmann, 477 U.S.
at 454-55). The Carrier standard requires a showing that error probably resulted in
the conviction of one who is innocent. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. The standard of the
Kuhlmann plurality requires a defendant to show by a fair probability that the trier
of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt of guilt. Kuhlman, 477 U.S. at
454, 455 n.17.
57. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865 (citing Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2517). Sawyer re-
quires clear and convincing evidence that absent constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty. Sawyer, 112 S.
Ct. at 2517.
58. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court reasoned that claims of actual innocence are less burden-
some to comity, finality, and judicial resources than claims alleging the erroneous
imposition of the death penalty. Id. The Court stated that a claim of actual inno-
cence requires new reliable evidence to support claims of constitutional error and
such evidence is unavailable in the majority of cases. Id. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that because claims of actual innocence are rare, and rarely successful, they
pose less of a threat to comity, finality and judicial resources. Id. at 865-66. In
selecting the Carrier standard as the appropriate standard of proof, the Court con-
sidered the individual's interest in avoiding injustice to be the greater interest. Id.
at 866. The Court stated that the execution of a person who is entirely innocent is
the quintessential miscarriage of justice. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that "the
overriding importance of the greater individual interest merits a less exacting stan-
dard of proof on a habeas petitioner alleging a fundamental miscarriage of justice
than one alleging that his sentence is too severe." Id.
Vol. 34:373
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order to reach the merits of procedurally barred constitutional
claims."1
After determining that the Carrier standard was appropriate,
the Court elaborated on the required burden of proof.62 In order
to meet the burden, the Court stated that a petitioner must
show that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the
conviction of one who was actually innocent.63 To establish
probability, the Court noted that petitioners must show that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted them in light of the new evidence.' The Court stated
that to establish actual innocence, petitioners must also show by
a preponderance of the evidence that no reasonable juror would
have found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.65 Therefore,
the Court stated, petitioners must persuade the district court
that in light of the evidence, no reasonable juror would have
found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and a court
reviewing a petition is required to determine the probability of
what jurors would do.66  The Court also distinguished the
substantial showing required by Carrier from the standard
announced in Jackson v. Virginia,7 which governs review of
claims of insufficient evidence.6" According to the Court,
Jackson places the credibility of witnesses beyond the scope of
review and Carrier allows new evidence to affect the credibility
of witnesses presented at trial.6 9 The Court stated that the role
of the trier of fact also distinguishes Carrier from Jackson."
The Court noted that, while Jackson focuses on what a jury can
or has the power to do as a matter of law, Carrier focuses on the
probability of what a jury is likely to do.7" Therefore, the Court
61. Id. at 867.
62. Id.
63. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (citing Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496).
64. Id.
65. Id. The Court interpreted the Carrier standard as focusing on a
petitioner's actual innocence, thus allowing review of evidence that was excluded or
unavailable at trial. Id. Although a broader array of evidence is considered than at
trial, the Court stated that the analysis must incorporate the concept of reasonable
doubt. Id. The Court stated that the question was not whether a reasonable doubt
existed, but whether no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. Id.
at 867-68.
66. Id. at 868.
67. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
68. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 868. The Jackson standard tests the sufficiency of
the evidence adduced at trial and requires a defendant to prove that no rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443
U.S. at 324.
69. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
70. Id.
71. Id. The rule in Jackson of whether the jury could convict was deemed by
1996
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stated that while a showing of sufficient evidence to convict
would determine a claim under Jackson, the same would not be
true under Carrier.72
The Court found that the new evidence cast doubt on whether
Schlup could have committed the crime, and if taken as true, it
could not be said that a juror following instructions which
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt would vote to convict.7"
Had Carrier or Sawyer been properly applied, the Court stated
that Schlup's showing of innocence would not be insufficient
solely because the record contained sufficient evidence to
convict.7 '
The Court concluded that the trial court erroneously applied
the Sawyer standard and should have applied the Carrier
standard." The Court further stated that when applying the
Carrier standard, courts must assess new evidence in connection
with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.76 In addition, courts
may consider the timing of the submission and the likely
credibility of affiants in relation to the reliability of the
evidence.77
Because the courts below evaluated the record under an
improper standard, the Supreme Court deemed that further
proceedings were necessary.7" The decision of the court of
appeals was vacated and the case was remanded with
instructions to remand to the district court for further
proceedings.79
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion that summarized
the Court's holding that in order to have an abusive or
successive habeas claim heard on the merits, petitioners must
prove that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted them." Justice O'Connor supported the
standard set by the Court, stating that it properly balances the
dictates of justice with the need to ensure that the actual
the Court to focus on whether or not the jury has the power to convict. Id. The
Court stated that the power to convict is determined by whether the trier of fact
has the power as a matter of law. Id. According to the Court, use of the word
"would" in Carrier focuses on the likely behavior of the trier of fact. Id.
72. Id. at 868-69. The Court stated that the same reasoning set forth in Jack-
son was used by the Eighth Circuit in applying the Sawyer standard to Schiup. Id.
73. Id. at 869.





79. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
80. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Vol. 34:373
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innocence exception remains open for extraordinary cases."
Justice O'Connor stated that it was an abuse of discretion to
base judgment on an erroneous view of the law and that the
district court abused its discretion by relying on Sawyer instead
of Carrier.2 Therefore, Justice O'Connor opined that abuse of
discretion should have been the standard of review applied by
the Court in this case. 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas in the first of two dissenting opinions." Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Sawyer standard of clear and
convincing evidence should apply to claims of guilt or innocence
as well as to challenges to a petitioner's sentence.8 5 Chief
Justice Rehnquist opined that he would have affirmed the court
of appeal's use of the Sawyer standard, and stated that the
Sawyer standard balances the states' interest in finality and the
federal courts' respect for federalism with Schlup's equity
interest based on a sufficient showing of actual innocence.86
In the alternative, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he
would have opted for a modified version of the Jackson rule."
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority failed to
acknowledge the similarities of Carrier and Jackson." The
Chief Justice further stated that a petitioner making a claim of
actual innocence under Carrier falls short of satisfying the
burden of proving actual innocence if the reviewing court
determines that any juror would have reasonably found the
petitioner guilty of the crime. 9 The Chief Justice concluded
that this achieved essentially the same result as under
Jackson.9"




84. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 872-73. The dissent quoted the Court in Sawyer, stating that inno-
cence of the death penalty like its actual innocence counterpart is a very narrow
exception. Id. at 873 (citing Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520). In order to be workable,
the Court in Sawyer opined that the exception must be subject to determination by
relatively objective standards. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520. The Sawyer Court con-
cluded that the appropriate standard a petitioner must meet is by "clear and convi-
ncing evidence" that but for a constitutional error no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 2523 n.15.
86. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873-74.
87. Id.





dissenting opinion.9' Justice Scalia cited 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b),
which states that a federal court need not entertain a writ of
habeas corpus when a prior petition has been denied on the
merits.9' Justice Scalia also stated that nothing in the Court's
prior decisions justified departing from the statute's plain
meaning.9' Justice Scalia further stated that the majority's
conclusion that a successive or abusive petition must be
entertained if a petitioner shows that a fundamental miscarriage
of justice has occurred, flatly contradicts the statute and is not
supported by precedent.9" Justice Scalia interpreted the
statutory section as giving the discretion to hear successive or
abusive claims to a trial court and, according to Justice Scalia,
the Court's holding took that discretion away.9 Justice Scalia
concluded that there was no statutory obligation and therefore,
no abuse of discretion. 6
Habeas corpus most commonly refers to a writ that is used to
test whether a person's detention or imprisonment is lawful as
opposed to testing a party's guilt or innocence. 7 The privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is extended to the citizens of the
United States by Article I of the United States Constitution.
98
Federal courts were first empowered to issue writs to prisoners
in custody under federal authority by the Judiciary Act of
1789."9 The authority to extend federal habeas corpus to
prisoners held in state custody was granted by Congress in
1867.0 The function of habeas corpus has since evolved from a
91. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 874 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 875 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988)).
93. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the outcome of the case should be controlled
by the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which has been held to mean that control-
ling weight may be given to a denial of a prior application for habeas corpus only if
the same ground has been determined on a prior application, the prior determina-
tion was on the merits, and if the ends of justice would not be served by reaching
the merits of the subsequent application. Id. at 876 (citing Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15).
94. Id. at 875.
95. Id. at 875-76.
96. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 878.
97. The most common form of a habeas corpus writ is used to test the legality
of a detention or imprisonment. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990). The
purpose of filing a writ of habeas corpus is to obtain release from unlawful impris-
onment. Id. The underlying issue to be resolved in granting the writ is whether in
depriving a prisoner of liberty, the prisoner's rights of due process have been violat-
ed. Id. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is also referred to as the great
writ of liberty. Id. at 710.
98. The United States Constitution states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habe-
as Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
99. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (repealed 1877).
100. See The Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (cur-
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narrow test of a sentencing court's jurisdiction to a broadened
review of the constitutional errors leading to conviction." 1
Currently the term "writ of habeas corpus" refers to all
dispositive constitutional claims presented in a proper
procedural manner.0 2
At common law res judicata did not attach to denials of
habeas relief and courts were bound to consider petitions
previously presented and denied in other courts.' 3  As
appellate review became more available, the common law rule
was modified and courts considered and afforded weight to the
existence of other remedies and prior refusal of a petition."
Therefore, although res judicata was not strictly applied,
controlling weight was given to prior adjudication when a
subsequent petition raised the same grounds."5
In addition to restricting a petitioner's ability to bring
subsequent habeas claims raising the same issues, the common
law also evolved to restrict petitions raising issues not raised in
prior petitions."6 When a claim was not raised as the basis of
a prior petition, the state pleaded abuse of the writ.10 7 When a
state pled abuse of a writ, a petitioner was required to show
adequate grounds for not raising the issue previously."°8
Therefore, if a court decided that a new claim could have or
should have been raised in a prior petition, the failure to do so
constituted abuse of the writ and a subsequent petition was not
considered. '"
A court's discretion to hear successive and abusive writs of
habeas corpus was restricted by statute in 1966."' According
rent version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43, 2251-53 (1988)).
101. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991). Use of habeas corpus writs
has expanded to include the review of sentences imposed without statutory authori-
zation, sentences imposed under unconstitutional statutes and convictions obtained
without adequate procedural protections. McClesky, 499 U.S. at 478.
102. Id. at 479.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 481 (citing Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924)).
105. Id. at 482.
106. McClesky, 499 U.S. at 482.
107. Id. (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 488 (citing Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 378-79 (1984)).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b) (1988). The statute states:
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to
a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of
such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States
on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court
is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
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to the statute, a court need not entertain an application for a
habeas writ if it is successive and the court is satisfied that
entertaining such a writ will not serve the ends of justice."' A
court also need not consider a subsequent writ raising new
grounds unless the court is satisfied that the new grounds were
not deliberately withheld or the writ has not otherwise been
abused."'
In addition to granting a court discretion to decide whether to
entertain a habeas petition, the discretion to dismiss a habeas
petition was also set forth by statute."' A court is empowered
to dismiss a habeas petition for delay unless the grounds raised
by the petitioner could not have been discovered by the exercise
of reasonable diligence."' A subsequent petition or motion may
be dismissed if the grounds raised were previously determined
on the merits or, if based upon new grounds, failure to raise the
new grounds constituted abuse."5
(b) When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the
United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody
or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent
application for a writ of habias corpus in behalf of such person need not be
entertained by a court of the United States unless the application alleges and
is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of
the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is
satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1988).
112. Id. § 2244(b).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules 9(a) & (b) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rules 9(a)
& (b) (1988).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rule 9(a) (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) states:
(a) Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state
of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that
it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rule 9(a) states:
(a) Delayed motions. A motion for relief may be made pursuant to these rules
may be dismissed if it appears that the government has been prejudiced in its
ability to respond to the motion by delay in its filing unless the movant shows
that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the
exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the gov-
ernment occurred.
28 U.S.C § 2255 Rule 9(a) (1988).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) states:
(b) Successive petitions. A second or successive petition may be dismissed if
the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and
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The Supreme Court examined a court's discretion in applying
equitable principles to habeas corpus cases in light of the
statutory guidelines in Jackson v. Virginia."' The Court in
Jackson considered the issue of the correct standard to apply in
a habeas corpus proceeding when a petitioner claims that the
evidence of guilt is insufficient to support conviction.117
The Jackson Court affirmed that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element which constitutes a crime."' The Court
reasoned that the duty of a federal court is to assess the
historical facts when applying a constitutional standard to a
state court conviction applied to federal habeas corpus
proceedings."' Upon examination of the federal habeas corpus
statute, the Court concluded that federal courts have a duty to
presume a fair state trial and fair state post-trial remedies when
assessing claims of federal constitutional error. 20 Applying a
reasonable doubt standard and considering a court's duties to
assess the facts and constitutional claim, the Court held that a
petitioner is entitled to relief if the court finds that no rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.' The Court concluded that in the instant case a
reasonable trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and affirmed Jackson's conviction.
22
the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds
are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those
grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rule 9(b) states:
(b) Successive motions. A second or successive motion may be dismissed if the
judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the
prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the movant to assert those grounds
in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure governed by these
rules.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rule 9(b) (1988).
116. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
117. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 309. The petitioner, Jackson, claimed that the evi-
dence produced at trial was insufficient to prove premeditation and therefore, insuffi-
cient to convict him of first degree murder. Id. at 310-11. In Virginia, premeditation
is an essential element of first degree murder. Id. at 309. Murder of the first degree
is classified as a class 2 felony carrying a sentence of 20 years to life. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-10(b) (Michie 1988).
118. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
119. Id. at 318.
120. Id. at 323 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d) (1988)).
121. Id. at 324.
122. Id. The Court assessed Jackson's behavior both before and after the killing
and found that he was capable of premeditated murder. Id. at 325. The Court noted
that he fired several shots, reloaded the weapon and then shot the victim twice. Id.
388 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:373
While the Court's decision in Jackson developed a standard of
review regarding evidence at trial, the Court in Murray v.
Carrier..3 developed a standard of review regarding post-trial
proceedings.' The Carrier Court considered the effect of
procedural default with respect to a petitioner's claim for habeas
relief.'25 Specifically, the Court considered whether counsel's
inadvertence in failing to raise a claim was sufficient cause to
set aside a procedural default.12
The Court noted that deliberate default of a constitutional
claim by counsel, absent extraordinary circumstances, binds a
petitioner." 7  The Court further reasoned that the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial does not include an
assurance that defense counsel will raise every constitutional
claim.'28 The Court concluded that the failure to recognize a
constitutional claim or the failure to raise it once recognized
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and
therefore was not sufficient cause for procedural default.'29
After considering the states' interests in applying procedural
Therefore, the Court found that the trial judge could reasonably have found that
Jackson possessed the requisite intent at or before the murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
123. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
124. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 481-82.
125. Id. at 481.
126. Id. The defendant, Carrier, was convicted of rape and abduction. Id. at
482. Both the presiding motions judge and the trial judge denied Carrier's motion to
discover the victim's statements prior to trial. Id. After an in camera examination,
both judges determined that the statements contained no exculpatory evidence. Id.
Carrier alleged that he was denied due process of law because the trial court would
not permit defense counsel's pre-trial examination of the victim's written statements
which were withheld by the prosecution. Id. Both the state court and the federal
district court dismissed the habeas petition, stating that Carrier's failure to raise the
issue on direct appeal constituted a procedural default and thus barred review. Id.
at 483. The district court further held that Carrier had not exhausted his state
remedies and he should have established cause for the default in state court. Id.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court, holding that in
order to establish cause, petitioners need only show that the failure to object or ap-
peal was due to their attorneys' ignorance or oversight. Id. at 484.
127. Id. at 485 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)). The Court
stated that default of a constitutional claim by counsel as part of trial strategy
binds petitioners, absent extraordinary circumstances, even if they have not personal-
ly waived the claim. Id.
128. Id.
129. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 486-87. After ruling out attorney inadvertence and ne-
glect as cause for default, the Court determined that cause must be based on a
petitioner's showing of an objective external factor which impeded counsel's efforts to
comply with the procedural rule. Id. at 488. Alternatively, the Court held that a
petitioner may show cause by showing ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The
Court further held that an ineffective assistance claim must be presented to a state
court before it may be used to establish cause for default. Id. at 489.
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default on appeal and at trial, the Court held that the failure to
raise a claim on appeal resulting in a state procedural default is
subject to a cause and prejudice standard.'30 The Court further
held that attorney error must amount to ineffective assistance in
order to constitute sufficient cause under the cause and
prejudice standard.'3 ' The Court held that cause for procedural
default on appeal requires the showing of an external
impediment to the construction or raising of a claim.132
Prior to applying the standard to the facts, the Court
reaffirmed that both cause and actual prejudice must be shown
to overcome a procedural default in a habeas proceeding
challenging a state court conviction." The Court specifically
rejected any contention that cause need not be shown if actual
prejudice is shown."34 The Court stated that this rule is
applicable to constitutional claims that challenge legal guilt.
135
Although the Court held that the cause and prejudice
standard applies to claims challenging legal guilt, the Court
distinguished and excepted claims arising from a fundamentally
unjust incarceration.3 6 The Court noted that such an exception
would occur when a constitutional violation resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent."3 7 In this instance,
the Court opined, a court may grant a writ without the requisite
showing of cause to overcome a procedural defect."ts
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court noted
that the petitioner did not allege any external impediment nor
that his counsel's performance justified a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.'39 Therefore, the Court held that cause
130. Id. at 492. The Court stated that failure to raise a claim on appeal frus-
trates a state's interests by depriving an appellate court of trial error review, thus
reducing the finality of appellate proceedings and undermining the enforcement of
the state's procedural rules. Id. (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)).
131. Id.
132. Id. The elements included in the objective impediments requirement are a
showing that the factual or legal basis for the claim was not available to counsel
and a showing of interference by officials. Id. at 488.
133. Id. at 494 (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976)).
134. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494-95.
135. Id. at 495.
136. Id. at 495-96 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). The Court
stated that a fumdamentally unjust incarceration would overcome the standard of
cause and prejudice in appropriate cases. Id.
137. Id. at 496.
138. Id. The Court opined that although claims arising from a fundamental
miscarriage of justice would normally meet the cause and prejudice standard, ex-
traordinary cases involving the conviction of defendants who are actually innocent
would be excepted. Id.
139. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 497.
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had not been established and the defaulted claim should be
dismissed absent a showing of actual innocence upon
remand.'
On the same day that Carrier was decided, the Court
considered the issue of whether a federal court should entertain
the claims of a successive habeas petition in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson."' Joseph Allen Wilson ("Wilson") filed a second habeas
petition that raised a claim that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated."' Wilson filed a second petition following the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Henry,'" in
which the Court held that statements made to a paid jailhouse
informant should be suppressed.'" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the trial court's opinion that the
ends of justice required reaching the merits of the claim, as well
as the trial court's application of Henry."
In Kuhlmann, the Court began by noting that although a
habeas petitioner must prove that reaching the merits of a
successive petition would serve the ends of justice, there is little
specific guidance as to the kind of proof required to establish
that the ends of justice would be served by relitigation.'" After
140. Id.
141. 477 U.S. 436, 444 (1986).
142. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 442. Wilson was convicted of murdering a night
dispatcher at a taxicab garage during a robbery. Id. at 439-41. Prior to trial, Wilson
admitted he was involved in the robbery and murder to a prisoner, Benny Lee
("Lee"), who occupied an adjoining cell. Id. at 439-40. Lee reported the conversation
to the police and Wilson alleged that the investigative method of obtaining his state-
ments through Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting incriminating
statements in the absence of counsel. Id. at 441 (citing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall . .. have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." Id.
143. 477 U.S. 264 (1980).
144. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 442 (citing United States v. Henry, 477 U.S. 264
(1980)). The first petition for habeas relief was denied by the district court, which
found that no interrogation had occurred. Id. at 441. The court of appeals affirmed,
finding no violation of Wilson's Sixth Amendment rights and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Id. at 441-42 After the petitioner's second claim was denied by the
New York state trial court and appellate division, the second habeas claim was filed
in federal district court. Id. The district court again denied relief and stated that no
constitutional violation occurred because the informant made no affirmative effort to
elicit information about the crime charged. Id. at 442-43. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, finding the facts indistinguishable from Henry. Id. at
443. The court further found Henry applicable because Henry announced no new rule
of law, but applied settled principles to new facts. Id.
145. Id. at 444.
146. Id. at 444-45 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1963)).
The Court noted that a court must dismiss a successive petition unless reaching the
merits of the petition would serve the ends of justice. Id. (citing Sanders, 373 U.S.
at 15). The Court also stated that the burden of proving that relitigation would
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considering the common law and statutory history of habeas
corpus writs, the Court determined that the ends of justice
standard is based upon the balancing of a prisoner's interest in
release, if innocent, with a state's interests in finality. "7
Therefore, the Court concluded that the ends of justice standard
only requires the entertainment of successive petitions which
supplement constitutional claims with a colorable showing of
factual innocence." The Court further concluded that this
showing must be made even though evidence of guilt was
unlawfully admitted.""
The Court disposed of the Henry issue, stating that had the
court of appeals been correct in hearing the successive petition,
it was error to grant relief.5 ' The Court stated that the Henry
Court applied the Massiah test to incriminating statements
made to jailhouse informants.' 5' The essential element of the
test is secret interrogation by techniques which are the
equivalent of direct police interrogation.'52  The Court
concluded that a petitioner must show that the informant and
the police acted to deliberately elicit incriminating
statements.'5
In reversing the decision below, the Court stated that the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the trial court's findings
were to be accorded a presumption of correctness." The trial
serve the ends of justice is on the petitioner. Id. (citing Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17).
147. Id. at 445-54. The Court discussed the history of habeas writs beginning
with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. at 445 n.7. The Court further discussed the stat-
utory and common law evolution leading to the ends of justice exception to the deni-
al of successive petitions set forth by statute and case law. Id. at 445-54.
148. Id. at 454.
149. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454. A colorable showing of factual innocence re-
quires a prisoner to show that in light of all the evidence, including evidence which
was illegally admitted, wrongly excluded or not available until after trial, the trier
of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt about guilt. Id. at 454 n.17.
150. Id. at 456.
151. Id. at 458. The Massiah test states that once a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel has attached, the defendant is denied that right when federal
agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements in the absence of counsel.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
152. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 459-60. The Court noted that the court of appeals conceded that the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Id. at 455. Because a trier of fact could not
entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt in light of all the evidence, the Court
opined that Wilson had not met the requisite showing of factual innocence. Id. The
Court stated that because Wilson did not make out a colorable showing of factual
innocence, the ends of justice were not served by relitigating the claim. Id. There-
fore, the Court held that the court of appeals should have dismissed the claim under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and the Court stated that the judgement denying the successive
claim was final. Id. See supra note 110 for the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
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court found that the informant did not ask any questions, but
only listened to the petitioner's spontaneous unsolicited
statements.'55 The Court held that the court of appeal's
conclusion ignored the trial court's findings of fact and guilt and
therefore amounted to clear error.5"
The Court refined the previously obscure standard for
determining an abuse of a writ of habeas corpus in McClesky v.
Zant.'57  In a second federal habeas corpus petition, the
petitioner, McClesky, complained that a jailhouse informant was
acting on behalf of the state to deliberately elicit inculpatory
admissions, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the issue of whether a state must show deliberate abandonment
of a claim by a petitioner to establish that the presentation of
the claim in a subsequent habeas petition is "abuse of the
writ."
5 9
After an extensive review of the statutory history and case
law of habeas writs, the Court determined that the emergent
themes in abuse of the writ cases are deliberate abandonment
and inexcusable neglect."6 The Court reasoned that because
inexcusable neglect in abuse of the writ cases focused on a
petitioner's conduct and implicated the same concerns as cases
seeking relief from procedural default, the same standard should
155. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 460.
156. Id. at 460-61.
157. 499 U.S. 467 (1991). The Court noted that "abuse of the writ" was defined
obliquely through dicta, denials of certiorari and denials of stay applications.
McClesky, 499 U.S. at 477. The murder conviction and death sentence of Warren
McClesky ("McClesky") were obtained partially upon evidence of admissions he made
to Offie Evans ("Evans"), a prisoner in an adjacent cell. Id. at 470. Evans testified
that McClesky not only admitted to shooting the police officer, but "boasted that he
would have shot his way out of the store even in the face of a dozen policemen." Id.
158. Id. at 474 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)).
159. Id. at 477. The district court granted relief, finding that McClesky's failure
to discover evidence, including a 21 page document containing Evans' statements,
was not inexcusable neglect. Id. at 475. The court further found that the evidence
was not reserved or deliberately withheld for a second federal petition. Id. The court
of appeals reversed, stating that the burden is on a petitioner to show that the
failure to previously raise the claim was not due to inexcusable neglect nor was the
claim deliberately abandoned. Id. at 476-77. The court of appeals denied relief,
stating that because McClesky previously raised a claim in a state habeas proceed-
ing, but did not raise it in the first federal habeas proceeding, he made a knowing
choice not to pursue the claim. Id. at 476. The Supreme Court held that this consti-
tuted a prima facie showing of deliberate abandonment. Id.
160. Id. at 489. Prior to reaching this determination, the Court summarized the
history of writs of habeas corpus, the application of res judicata and the effect of
the appellate process in hearing subsequent petitions, the statutory developments




govern both.'' The Court held that a petitioner failing to raise
a claim at the appropriate time must show cause and
prejudice."2 Applying this rule, the Court stated that once the
prosecution satisfies its burden of pleading abuse of a writ, the
burden shifts to the petitioner to show cause and prejudice.'63
Although the Court held that the cause and prejudice standard
applies to abuse of writ cases, the Court noted that a petitioner
may obtain relief by showing that a fundamental miscarriage of
justice will result from a court's failure to entertain the
claim. "'
Applying the cause and prejudice standard to the facts, the
Court held that McClesky had not met the required showing
because he knew or should have known the critical facts
necessary to raise his claim in his first federal petition." The
Court noted that because McClesky could not show cause, there
was no need for the Court to consider prejudice. 66 The Court
agreed with the district court's finding of McClesky's guilt and
held that McClesky could not meet the fundamental miscarriage
of justice exception.6 7
The Court also considered the fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception to a showing of cause and prejudice in
reference to defaulted, successive and abusive habeas claims in
Sawyer v. Whitley.' s The Court determined that a habeas
petitioner must show actual innocence to reach the merits of a
161. Id. at 490.
162. McClesky, 499 U.S. at 493. The Court opined that both procedural default
cases and inexcusable neglect cases implicate significant costs of review and finality.
Id. The Court stated that review detracts from the finality of judgments and
therefore criminal law loses some of its deterrent effect and a state loses power to
enforce its laws. Id. The Court further stated that review in such cases may provide
an incentive for litigants to withhold claims. Id. at 491-92.
163. Id. at 494. The Court noted that the prosecution satisfies its burden of
pleading abuse of a writ by documenting the prior writ history, alleging abuse of the
writ and identifying the claims appearing for the first time. Id. The petitioner's
burden to show cause in this context requires a showing that an external factor
impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim previously, or that a factual or legal
basis for the claim was not available. Id. In addition to cause, a petitioner must
show actual prejudice from the errors complained of. Id. (citing United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)).
164. Id. The Court defined a fundamental miscarriage of justice in this context
as an instance when a constitutional violation has probably caused the conviction of
an innocent person. Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)).
165. Id. at 499-500. The Court stated that even though McClesky did not have
the 21 page Evans document, he knew of the contents because he participated in
the conversations reported by Evans. Id. at 500.
166. Id. at 502.
167. McClesky, 499 U.S. at 502-03.
168. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
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defaulted, successive or abusive habeas claim.'69  The
petitioner, Robert Wayne Sawyer ("Sawyer"), filed a second
federal habeas petition containing both successive and abusive
claims following his conviction for capital murder. 7 °
In Sawyer, the Court reaffirmed prior decisions that held that
a court will usually not reach the merits of procedurally
defaulted, successive, or abusive habeas claims absent a showing
of cause and prejudice.' The Court also reaffirmed that
absent a showing of cause and prejudice, the merits of a habeas
claim may be reached if a petitioner shows either actual
innocence or that failure to hear the claim would constitute a
miscarriage of justice.'72 In addition, the Court noted that
innocence in this context only applies to claims of actual
innocence and not legal innocence.'
73
The Court distinguished the concepts of actual innocence and
legal innocence, stating that showing the kind of error which
might have affected the accuracy of a death sentence differs
from demonstrating that a defendant may be innocent of the
sentence received. 174 To rely on the miscarriage of justice
exception, the Court opined that error must affect the reliability
of the guilt determination as opposed to showing that a
constitutional error resulted in the wrongful admission 'of
truthful evidence.' Upon making this distinction, the Court
refined the meaning of "actual innocence" with respect to capital
punishment. 7 '
169. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2517.
170. Id. Sawyer and Charles Lane were convicted of murdering Francis Wood
by punching, kicking, and submerging her in a bathtub, scalding her with water and
then dousing her with lighter fluid and igniting her body. Id. The first habeas peti-
tion was denied by the district court on the merits. Id. at 2518. The court of ap-
peals affirmed and the Supreme Court affirmed after granting certiorari. Id. On
review of the second petition, the district court denied relief on one claim and dis-
missed the others as abusive or successive. Id. The court of appeals considered
whether Sawyer had shown actual innocence sufficient to reach the merits of his
successive petition. Id. The court of appeals held that Sawyer failed to show actual
innocence because he had not shown that he was ineligible for the death penalty
under Louisiana law. Id.
171. Id. at 2518 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77 (1977), Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451 (1986), McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-93 (1991)
and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)).
172. Id. at 2518-19.
173. Id. at 2519.
174. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2519.
175. Id. (citing McClesky, 499 U.S. at 502). The Court directly quoted McClesky,
stating: "[Tihe exception for miscarriage of justice was of no avail to the petitioner
because the constitutional violation, if it occurred, resulted in the admission at trial
of truthful inculpatory evidence which did not affect the reliability of the guilt de-
termination." Id. (quoting McClesky, 499 U.S. at 502).
176. Id. The Court determined that the standard for actual innocence regarding
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In selecting the proper basis for the actual innocence
standard, the Court constructed a framework to determine
whether a petitioner is "innocent of death."'77 The Court noted
that there are two sets of factors addressed by state statutes
which determine whether a person is eligible for the death
penalty.'78 The Court stated that the first set of factors are
those factors which determine generally the types of offenders
which are eligible for the death penalty. 9 The Court identified
the second set of factors as those which comprise the
aggravating and mitigating factors used to determine whether
the death penalty shall be imposed on a particular
defendant.' The Court concluded that the actual innocence
standard should focus on aggravating factors and not mitigating
evidence which was precluded as a result of constitutional
error.' Therefore, the Court opined that it must determine if
petitioners have shown by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable jury would find them
eligible for the death penalty under state law.'82
Applying the above standard, the Court noted that the jury
found two aggravating factors arising from Sawyer's conviction
of first degree murder." Because Sawyer's evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel did not relate to his guilt or the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury, the Court held
that Sawyer's successive claim did not meet the requisite
capital cases should be analogous to the actual innocence standard in non-capital
cases. Id. at 2520. In developing the standard for actual innocence, the Court opined
that the exception for actual innocence of the death penalty should be narrow and
subject to objective standards. Id.
177. Id. at 2520.
178. Id. at 2520-21.
179. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520-21.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2523 (citing Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 361 (1992) and Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820
(5th Cir. 1991), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992)). The Court adopted the standard in
use by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. The Eleventh Circuit test states that
petitioners may show that they are actually innocent of the death penalty by show-
ing that, but for constitutional error, no aggravating factors could have been found.
Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1183. The Fifth Circuit standard requires petitioners to show
that based on all the evidence, a rational trier of fact would have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to the prerequisites for the imposition of the death penalty.
Sawyer, 945 F.2d at 820.
182. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523.
183. Id. Sawyer was convicted of first degree murder and thus was eligible for
the death penalty because the intentional killing he was convicted of was done while
committing an aggravated arson. Id. The two aggravating factors found by the jury
were that the murder was committed during the course of an aggravated arson and
the murder was especially cruel, atrocious, and heinous. Id.
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showing for actual innocence of the death penalty and therefore,
there was no fundamental miscarriage of justice.' The Court
affirmed the court of appeals and held that Sawyer failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have
found him eligible for the death penalty."5
The Supreme Court considered whether newly discovered
evidence of innocence standing alone is grounds for habeas
corpus relief on a successive claim in Herrera v. Collins."6
Leonel Torres Herrera ("Herrera") was sentenced to death for
the murder of two police officers. 87 Eight years after his
sentencing, Herrera claimed actual innocence of the crimes
based on new evidence.' Because Herrera's second federal
habeas petition alleged innocence, he claimed that his execution
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution."9
184. Id. at 2524.
185. Id. at 2525. After considering the undisputed evidence and the evidence
that was allegedly wrongfully excluded, the Court stated that it cannot be said that
no reasonable juror would have found that Sawyer was guilty of aggravated arson
for his participation. Id. at 2524. The Court stated that although the excluded evi-
dence applies to the finding of aggravated arson and the crime of first degree mur-
der, the evidence did not show that no rational juror would find that aggravating
circumstances were present. Id. The Court further stated that the undisputed evi-
dence of torture, such as beating and scalding, sufficiently showed the second ag-
gravated circumstance that the crime was cruel, atrocious and heinous. Id.
186. 113 S. Ct. 853, 862-63 (1993).
187. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856. Herrera pled guilty to the murder of officer
David Rucker ("Rucker"), who was shot in the head and found lying near his patrol
car. Id. at 857. Prior to his guilty plea, Herrera was tried and convicted of the mur-
der of officer Enrique Carrisalez ("Carrisalez"). Id. Carrisalez was shot in the chest
by the driver of a vehicle which was pulled over for speeding and which was headed
away from the scene of the Rucker murder. Id. Carrisalez and Officer Enrique
Hernandez ("Hernandez"), who was present at Carrisalez' shooting, identified
Herrera. Id. Blood and hair samples were used to connect Herrera to the death of
Officer Rucker. Id.
188. Id. at 857. Herrera claimed that the murders were committed by his de-
ceased brother, Raul Herrera Sr. ("Raul Sr."). Id. Herrera produced two affidavits as
support that Raul Sr. had committed the murders. Id. at 858. Attorney Hector
Villareal (WVillareal"), who had represented Raul Sr. on other criminal charges, stat-
ed that Raul Sr. admitted to committing the murders. Id. Villareal also stated that
Raul Sr. was murdered and that the murder was related to drug trafficking matters
which involved Herrera and officer Rucker. Id. An affidavit of Juan Franco
Pallacious stated that Raul Sr. admitted to the murders while they were cellmates.
Id.
189. Id. at 858. Herrera's appeals and application for state habeas relief which
challenged the identification made by the officers were denied. Id. Herrera's first
federal habeas petition raised the same challenges and was denied. Id. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari and Herrera filed a second habeas petition based on the
newly discovered evidence. Id. The state district court denied relief, stating that no
evidence at trial suggested that anyone other than Herrera committed the offense
Recent Decisions
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Herrera by stating
that although a person first charged with a crime is entitled to a
presumption of innocence and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, 90 due process does not require that every step be taken
to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.191
The Court further stated that once defendants have been fairly
tried and convicted, the presumption of innocence disappears
and they come before a court convicted by due process of law
rather than as presumed innocent.'92
The Court next questioned the appropriateness of the remedy
of habeas relief, stating that actual innocence itself has never
been a ground for habeas relief.193 Because federal courts sit to
provide relief to those imprisoned in violation of the Constitution
and not to correct errors of fact, the Court opined that newly
discovered evidence relevant to guilt must bear upon the
constitutionality of the detention.' The Court noted that
although the decision in Jackson v. Virginia9 reviewed the
sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, the claim in Jackson was
distinguishable from that in Herrera because there was an
independent constitutional issue raised.9 "
In concluding that a claim of actual innocence alone is not
grounds for habeas relief, the Court reaffirmed that a proper
showing of actual innocence will allow a court to reach the
merits of an otherwise successive or abusive constitutional
claim.9 7 The Court further stated that a claim of actual
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. Herrera then filed the second
petition for habeas relief in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id.
The district court dismissed the majority of the claims in the petition as abusive
and denied relief. Id. at 859. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also denied relief,
stating that absent an accompanying constitutional violation, the existence of newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a prisoner is not a ground for habeas
relief. Id.
190. Id. at 859 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
191. Id. at 860 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
192. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610
(1974)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
195. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
196. Id. at 861 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-20). The Court distinguished
Jackson for raising the independent constitutional issue of whether evidence present-
ed at trial was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318)). The Court also distinguished Jackson for limiting the
evidentiary review to record evidence and limiting the inquiry to whether the trier
of fact made a rational decision to convict or acquit. Id. Conversely, Herrera request-
ed review of newly discovered evidence to determine whether the trier of fact made
the correct decision of guilt or innocence. Id.
197. Id. at 862 (citing Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2514).
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innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but is the threshold
a defendant must meet for a court to reach the merits of an
otherwise barred constitutional claim.'98 Therefore, the Court
denied Herrera's claim and held that, when a petitioner's only
basis for habeas relief is that newly discovered evidence shows
that the conviction was factually incorrect, the fundamental
miscarriage of justice standard is inapplicable.'99
The Court next disposed of Herrera's Eighth Amendment
claim."' The Court distinguished Herrera's case from cases
requiring an increased reliability of the judicial process when
capital punishment is to be imposed.2"' The Court considered
Herrera's claim for relief in terms of punishment.2 2 The Court
reasoned that Herrera's request to vacate the death sentence as
opposed to granting a new trial was inappropriate in an Eighth
Amendment claim based upon actual innocence." 3 The Court
further reasoned that Herrera's claim was outside the purview
of the Eighth Amendment because his claim focused on
innocence and not on punishment."°
The Court disposed of Herrera's claim regarding the state's
time limit on motions for a new trial because of Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process.0 5  Recognizing that
substantial deference is given to a legislature in matters of
criminal process, the Court stated that a fundamental principle
of justice must be offended before a defendant's due process
rights are violated.' 6 Upon reviewing historical and present
practice regarding new trials, the Court found that Texas'
refusal to grant Herrera a new trial eight years after conviction
198. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
199. Id. at 862-63. The Court stated that the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception only applies to constitutional claims supplemented with a showing of factu-
al innocence. Id. at 862 (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)). As
the Court had never held that the standard extends to freestanding claims of actual
innocence, it deemed the standard to be inapplicable in such cases. Id. at 862-63.
200. Id. at 863.
201. Id. The Court doubted that a second trial held 10 years after the first
would produce a more reliable result. Id.
202. Id.
203. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863. The Court stated that it would be strange
jurisprudence to grant relief based on actual innocence and hold that Herrera could
not be executed, but could spend the rest of his life in prison. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 864-65. The Court reasoned that because Herrera came before the
Court as one convicted by due process of law, the question was one of procedural
due process. Id. at 864 n.6. The Court held that the question was not a substantive
inquiry of whether the execution of an innocent person violates due process, but
whether Herrera was procedurally entitled to judicial review of his actual innocence
claim. Id.
206. Id. at 864.
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did not violate principles of fundamental fairness."7
The Court denied relief and concluded that claims of actual
innocence are not treated as independent constitutional claims,
but rather as a basis for reaching a barred habeas claim on the
merits.0 8  The Court did not completely foreclose the
proposition that a demonstration of actual innocence made after
trial would render a defendant's execution unconstitutional and
therefore warrant federal habeas relief.2' Although such a
proposition was not totally foreclosed, the Court stated that the
showing to invoke such a right would necessarily be
extraordinarily high.21
The decision in Schiup illustrated the Court's struggle to
balance the restrictions on habeas procedures with a court's
interests in protecting a petitioner's constitutional rights. The
history of habeas writs shows that legislatures and courts tend
to restrict habeas petitions which unnecessarily burden judicial
resources and frustrate criminal trial courts' interests in comity
and finality of judgments."' Conversely, the Supreme Court
continued to carve out exceptions for claims that challenge a
petitioner's guilt. The Schlup Court recognized a need to satisfy
both interests and stated that the fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception seeks to balance societal interests in finality,
comity and conservation of judicial resources with an
individual's interest in justice."= The development of the
Court's views on habeas relief was significantly influenced by
207. Id. at 866. The Court's conclusion also considered contemporary practice
under amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 865 (citing
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 which places a two year time limit on filing a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence).
208. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. Although Herrera's federal constitutional claims
were dismissed, the Court implied that the appropriate form of relief would be
through executive clemency. Id. at 866. Texas clemency law allows a capital defen-
dant to request a full pardon, commutation of a death sentence or reprieve of an
execution. TEX. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 37 § 143.1 (West Supp. 1992). Specific guidelines
are also provided for pardons on the ground of innocence. Id. Therefore, the Court
concluded that while federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been
reserved for constitutional violations occurring in underlying state criminal proceed-
ings, the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence has been
executive clemency. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
209. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
210. Id. The Court stated that entertaining claims of actual innocence standing
alone would place an enormous burden on states that would have to retry stale
cases and would disrupt the finality of capital cases. Id. Upon review of the new
evidence presented, the Court held that Herrera's showing fell short of the sort of
threshold showing that innocence itself would render an execution unconstitutional.
Id.
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1988).
212. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
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the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and its amendments in 1966,
which were imposed to accord greater deference to the finality of
judgments in habeas proceedings." 3 The statute was enacted
to conserve judicial resources, and thus obligates the dismissal
of subsequent habeas petitions if a judge is satisfied that the
ends of justice would not be served by such an inquiry, or if the
applicant has not otherwise abused the writ.2"' This statutory
language sparked a series of cases leading to Schiup. As a
result, a district court's decision to hear or not hear the merits
of a petitioner's claim became the subject of judicial review.
Likewise, Schiup followed the Court's prior decisions which
reviewed a district court's initial determination of whether to
reach the merits of a subsequent habeas petition in light of "the
ends of justice."215
The Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the "ends of
justice" exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 have focused on a
petitioner's showing of innocence, whether the petitioner was
innocent of the crime, innocent of an element of the crime or
innocent of the punishment. Schlup, in accordance with this line
of cases, focused specifically on innocence of the crime as the
standard for reaching the merits of a habeas petition."' The
Schiup Court followed prior decisions requiring a showing of
innocence in some form and noted that ordinarily the merits of
successive claims may not be reached absent a showing of cause
and prejudice." 7 Therefore, the Court reviewed the case in
light of the "ends of justice" and specifically applied a
miscarriage of justice exception to a bar of successive and
abusive habeas claims.
The Court's decision in Schlup not only applied previously
settled principles, but resolved certain previously unanswered
issues. Schlup resolved the possibility that a court might reach
the merits of a procedurally barred habeas claim absent a
showing of cause and prejudice if a petitioner could show that a
constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent. 18 The decision in Schlup may also be
viewed as an expansion of principles discussed in Jackson and
Herrera. Jackson considered only record evidence2 19  in
213. Id. at 862 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 450).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b) (1988).
215. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 863.
216. Id. at 857..
217. Id. at 862-63.
218. Id. at 872 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
this issue was previously left open by Carrier. Id.
219. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jackson.
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determining whether to grant habeas relief and Schiup allowed
review of newly presented evidence and evidence of guilt
adduced at trial.2" Herrera left open the possibility that a
strong showing of innocence alone in a capital case absent
further available state remedies may provide a basis for habeas
relief. 2 '
Although the Court explicitly stated that Schlup's claim would
fail under Herrera,222 the showing of innocence in Schiup
provides petitioners guidance to presenting habeas claims absent
a constitutional violation and therefore subject to the undefined
extraordinarily high standard set by Herrera. A petitioner who
seeks habeas relief on the grounds of actual innocence without
an accompanying claim of a constitutional violation will need to
show proof of innocence beyond the showing made in Schiup to
meet such a burden. Therefore, Schlup sets the minimum
threshold a petitioner must meet before considering bringing a
claim of actual innocence under Herrera, and the maximum
burden necessary to reach the merits of a claim of actual
innocence when linked with a claim of constitutional violation.
Although Schiup may impose a cost to society in terms of the
comity, finality and efficient use of judicial resources, there is
also a benefit conferred in providing relief for unjust sentencing
as well as unjust incarcerations. The relief granted by Schiup is
that courts must merely reach the merits of a petitioner's claim
as opposed to releasing petitioners from prison, or even granting
new trials or reduction in sentences. Considering that the
benefit is essentially an opportunity to be heard, the cost does
not seem so great. The concept seems to fit well with the due
process concept of the right to a fair hearing.
James J. Turocy
220. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
221. See supra notes 186-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Herrera.
222. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 862.

